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Abstract 
This paper mainly focuses on two conjectures. Firstly the firm’s timing ability and secondly whether the firms 
are intentionally managing their pre-IPO discretionary accruals to overstate their earnings at the time of 
floatation to fetch higher price for their issues. In our study we do not find any evidence that supports the timing 
ability proposition of Ritter. But considering the cumulative abnormal return we find that in the long-run, IPOs 
have poor stock return when managers aggressively manage pre-IPO discretionary accruals of these firms than 
when they manage pre-IPO discretionary accruals conservatively. 
Keywords: Earning management, long-run underperformance, timing ability. 
 
1. Introduction 
Firms that went public in Bangladesh in the 1991-2007 periods significantly underperformed the market 
benchmark, in the five years after going public. In a sample of 99 IPOs during the period of 1991-2007, the 
average return on firms going public was 3.18% per year compared to 13.37% per year for market benchmark. 
The underperformance effect amounted to 10.19% per year. (Haque,2012) It certainly raises the question about 
the causes of this behavior. 
Using IPO data from the Bangladeshi market, this paper investigates two conjecturers about the long-
run poor performance of IPOs. Firstly, we examine the firms’ timing ability proposition, put forward by Ritter 
(1991) and Lougran,Ritter and Rydqvist(1994), that firms can successfully time their initial public offerings  to 
take the advantage of “windows of opportunity” created by investor overoptimisim, resulting in abnormally poor 
long-run returns.  
Secondly, we examine the conjecture that some managers of IPOs actively manage pre-IPO 
discretionary accruals in reporting enhanced earnings to achieve higher prices at the floatation, and it is mostly 
these firms following aggressive reporting strategies that subsequently perform poorly in the aftermarket. This 
type of activities aimed at overstating the current earnings to deceive stakeholders is known as earning 
management. Earnings management can be defined as the “alteration of firms’ reported economic performance 
by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes.” (Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 
2002). 
1.1 Literature Review 
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998 a &1998 b) report that firms manipulate earnings prior to initial and seasoned 
public offerings. Previous studies, such as Sloan (1996) and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2002), show that 
in the cross-sectional analysis, high earnings management firms underperform low earnings management firms. 
The predictability of stock returns implies that the market is initially fooled by manipulated earnings. 
Shang (2003) empirically proved that corporate executives attempt to manipulate stock prices by 
inflating earnings when they sell their company stocks or exercise options and by deflating earnings when they 
buy company stocks or delay option exercises. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, (2002) presented comparative 
evidence on corporate earning management on thirty one countries. Hence it can be inferred that earning 
management may be pervasive in nature but its magnitude may vary from country to country. 
Teoh and Wong (1997) interpreted abnormal accruals as a measure of earnings management, reported 
evidence that is consistent with analysts being misled by opportunistic earnings management by new equity 
issuers (both IPOs and SEOs). Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) compared the level of accruals of IPO and 
non-IPO firms around the issuing date. They found a significant difference in the level of accruals between both 
categories. DuCharme et al (2002) find that accruals are abnormally high around IPO offers. These accruals tend 
to reverse after stock offers and are negatively related to post-offer stock returns. Xie(2001) reports that 
abnormal accruals are negatively correlated with subsequent stock returns in the population of firms. 
Stein(1989), using a signaling model, shows that in efficient capital markets, myopic behavior like 
window-dressing may persist even when managers do care about stock price since it is a Nash equilibrium. In the 
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context of IPOs, his model implies that managers may attempt to manipulate investors’ belief by pumping up 
pre-IPO earnings to raise forecasted value of the firm. In equilibrium, the market is not fooled by this behavior: it 
correctly anticipates and adjusts for this in making its predictions of the valuation. Unfortunately, the preferred 
cooperative equilibrium in which there would involve no myopia on the part of managers and no conjecture of 
myopia (and hence no need of any adjustment for this behavior) by the market, cannot be sustained as a Nash 
equilibrium. Stein’s signal jamming model can also be extended to show that, in the equilibrium, managers may 
attempt to time issues and that rational investors anticipates and account for this behavior. If the market is able to 
account fully and immediately for such actions, the long-run stock price performance of IPO firms should be 
normal. However, the evidence of long-run underperformance of Bangladeshi IPOs suggests that earning 
management by managers of IPO is not anticipated and investors are subsequently disappointed by firms with 
high pre-IPO discretionary accruals. Our findings of systematic negative relationship between pre-IPO accruals 
and future stock price performance (and hence the predictable power of pre-IPO accruals on post-IPO returns) 
are consistent with this interpretation, suggesting that investors failed to properly adjust for pre-IPO 
discretionary accrual component of earning and hence their valuations appear related to pre-IPO earnings 
performance that they naively extrapolated to the future.  
In our study we do not find any evidence that supports the timing ability proposition of Ritter. We find 
that bullish-market issues are doing better than bear-market issues in the long-run, suggesting that firms might 
not have timing ability. However, the difference in the performance between bullish-market issues and bearish-
market issues is not statistically significant. Considering the Cumulative Abnormal return we also find that in the 
long-run, IPOs have poor stock return when managers aggressively manage pre-IPO discretionary accruals of 
these firms than when they manage pre-IPO discretionary accruals conservatively.  
The unexpected accruals of IPOs as a proxy for earnings management are extracted from an extension 
of the cross-sectional Jones’ (1991) model. The unexpected accruals are deemed unusual and thus termed as 
discretionary (managed). To measure abnormal stock return performance, we use market adjusted returns. The 
results are consistent with Earning Management Hypothesis. Using the market adjusted return, the most 
conservative quartile firms (firms with the lowest pre-IPO accruals) underperformed the marker benchmark by a 
cumulative -55.68% in the five years after going public. In contrast, the most aggressive quartile firms (firms 
with highest pre-IPO accruals) significantly underperformed by a cumulative -67.64% in the five years after 
going public. Thus our evidence indicates that investors failed to use all information contained in the 
discretionary pre-IPO accruals, and instead they appear to value firms going public based on the expectation that 
pre-IPO earnings performance will continue in future. Under this interpretation, the failure to adjust for the pre-
IPO accrual component of earning led investors to have high initial expectations of firms’ future earnings 
growth. Subsequent revelation about the appropriateness of the accruals in post-IPO financial statement caused a 
downward correction in stock price. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 describes methodology and estimation 
procedure. Section 3 examines the predictability of post-IPO stock price performance with market conditions and 
pre-IPO accruals. Finally, Section 4 concludes the results to related findings in Bangladeshi IPOs. 
 
2. Methodology and Estimation Procedure 
2.1 Estimation Procedure of Unexpected Scaled Accounting Accruals 
Following Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998), an extension of the cross-sectional Jones’ (1991) model has been used 
for this purpose.  Accruals are decomposed into two components: discretionary accruals and nondiscretionary 
accruals. Nondiscretionary accruals are the asset-scaled proxies for unmanipulated accruals dictated by business 
conditions. Discretionary accruals are the asset-scaled proxies for manipulated earnings determined at the 
discretion of management. Given the earlier discussion, it is expected that discretionary accruals (DAC) are the 
superior proxy for earnings management. The Jones model has been used widely in the Accounting literature. 
For example, Dechow (1994), and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), use the Jones model to detect whether 
earnings management exists. Sloan (1996) and Colins and Hribar (2000) use the Jones Model to show that the 
market appears to overestimate the persistence of the accruals components of earnings, and hence stock prices 
initially overreact to news on accruals. 
Haque (2012) investigates  the  long run performances of  IPOs in Bangladesh from 1991 to 2007 over 
first 60 months of trading. The performance of 99 IPOs are  documented and measured as average abnormal 
monthly returns (ARt) and average cumulative abnormal return metric (CARs,T), in percent excluding the initial 
equilibrium return. The Benchmark used here is value weighted All Share Price Index of Dhaka Stock Exchange. 
Imam and Haque (2012) also find that 15th day as the equilibrium price adjustment day for non-financial IPOs in 
Bangladeshi market. 
Imam and Jaber (2010) find evidence, using modified Jones model, powerful accrual testing 
methodology, that entrepreneurs of IPOs coming to the market during 1991-2000, behaved myopically in 
boosting earnings in the year prior to going public. They have shown that mean and median managed accruals of 
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sample IPO firms account for 6.0% and 4.24% of the total assets under the Modified Jones’ Model. The 
magnitudes of mean and median managed accruals are not only statistically significant but also economically 
significant. Thus Modified Jones’ Model of discretionary accruals test does detect a significant portion of 
managed accruals, which indicates an evidence of earnings manipulation by entrepreneurs of IPOs in the year 
prior to going public. It is also documented in that study that earnings management had a positive impact on 
initial firm’s value in support of “Value Relevance Hypothesis”. 
2.2 Selection of the Sample 
This study observed all IPO firms came to the public between January 1991 and December 2000 excluding 
Banks, Insurances and other non-banking Financial Institutions. IPOs of Banks, Insurances and other non-
banking Financial Institutions are excluded from the sample because their nature is different from non-financial 
institutions and post-IPO industry data of those financial institutions are not readily available. All IPOs (of non-
financial institutions) within this period, which provide adequate data, have been taken into the sample. It is 
found that a total of 79 IPOs went into public within this period. In those IPO firms 26 were green field, so that 
those firms are not considered into the sample because they do not have required data and management of those 
firms have no scope of manipulating earnings. Three IPO firms are excluded from the sample because of 
inadequate data in prospectus of 2 firms  and could not make available prospectus of one firm .Another three 
firms are also excluded from the sample which went on public in 1991 because cross-sectional regression is 
conducted with IPO data and industry data, in which industry data is also collected from 1991 to 2000 and 
changes in cash flow from operation and changes in adjusted revenue are calculated with those data, so 
regression for IPOs of the year 1991 has not been conducted for lacking of data. At last 47 IPO firms are 
included in the sample which have prospectus with required data of at least two years prior to going public with 
information of current assets, cash in hand and cash at bank, accounts receivable, current liabilities, gross 
property plant and equipment, depreciation of the year, total asset, net sales, net income, EBIT, proportion of 
ownership shares, offer price per share, total number of issues, and the name(s) of issue manager(s).  
Table 1. Status of Data of IPO Firms  
IPO Period – January 1991 to December 2000 
IPOs Came into Public 79 
Green Field IPOs 26 
Inadequate Data in Prospectus 02 
Unavailable Prospectus  01 
IPOs of 1991 03 
Sample Size of the Study 47 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Sample IPOs across Industry 
Industry Frequency % Cum. Freq. % 
Engineering 3 6.38 3 6.38 
Food and Allied Products 12 25.53 15 31.91 
Jute 1 2.13 16 34.04 
Textile 11 23.40 27 57.45 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 4 8.51 31 65.96 
Paper and Printing 1 2.13 32 68.09 
Services and Real Estate 2 4.26 34 72.34 
Miscellaneous 13 27.66 47 100.00 
Total 47 100.00   
Table 2 shows the distribution of sample according to the industry classification. According to 
Bangladesh Bank’s “Balance sheet Analysis of Joint Stock Companies”, industries are classified into ten 
categories within which there is no accepted IPO in Fuel and Power, and Cement categories. There are 
highest numbers of IPOs in miscellaneous category followed by food and allied products, and textile 
categories respectively. 
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Table 3. Time Distribution of Sample IPOs 
IPO Year Frequency % 
2000 3 6.38 
1999 5 10.64 
1998 2 4.26 
1997 8 17.02 
1996 11 23.40 
1995 4 8.51 
1994 13 27.66 
1993 1 2.13 
1992 0 0.00 
Total 47 100.00 
 
Table 3 shows the distribution of accepted sample IPOs according to the year of going public. In 1992 total of 
three IPO firms came into public in which prospectus of one IPO had inadequate data and the rest were green 
field. Hence the sample of IPOs in the year of 1992 turns out to be zero. The largest number of IPOs floated in 
the year of 1994 followed by the year of 1996 and 1997 respectively.  
2.3 Collection of Data 
IPO data are collected from the published prospectus of IPO firms. Calculation of discretionary accruals needs to 
run the regression with IPO data and cross-sectional industry data. Those industry data for the same period 
between January 1991 and December 2000 are collected from the “Balance Sheet Analysis of Joint Stock 
Companies” of 1998, 2001 and 2002 issues published by the Bangladesh Bank. Because of limited access to the 
original annual reports of the public listed companies, Bangladesh Banks’ data is preferred. Moreover in some 
cases original annual reports and data from Dhaka Stock Exchange are used when ever required. 
Data on discretionary accruals-a proxy for earning management are obtained from the paper “Earning 
Management of IPOs in Bangladesh-Test of Value Relevance Hypotheses: Evidence from Dhaka Stock 
Exchange” (Imam & Jaber, 2010). Following (Imam & Jaber, 2010) the detail of the modified Jones model and 
its calculation of discretionary accruals is given the appendix 1. 
Data on the long run underperformance of IPOs are extracted from the paper”Longrun price 
performance of Initial Public Offerings in Bangladesh”(Haque,2012).The detail methodology for calculating the 
long run underperfromaance is given in appendix 2. 
2.4 Test-Methods for Market Timing Ability 
To test the issuers’ timing ability proposition offered as an explanation of IPO long-run underperformance, we 
examine the effect of pre-IPO market conditions on the long-run after-market performance of IPOs. If the firms 
are able to time the issue, IPOs that come to the market during its relative pre-IPO bullishness must have poor 
aftermarket stock price performance. One of the proxies for pre-IPO market conditions is market run –ups prior 
to the offer date, which captures market upswings.4This proxy is based on observable data and backward-looking 
event time. hence this event time supposed to have less stringent information about firms’ timing ability than 
those of LRR (1994) who credit issuers with the ability to forecast market peak5.The market run-ups variable 
will be defined over the sixty six trading days (66 days) prior to the IPO offering day. An IPO is then defined to 
have occurred in a relatively bull period if the market return index on the offering day is at higher level than the 
past-quarter (66 trading day) average of the market return index preceding the offering day ( i.e.MIoff >MIavg66). 
Otherwise, the issue is defined to have been priced in a relatively bear market. Thus, the market condition is 
proxied by a dummy variable as follows: 
1 if the market is “bull” at the time of an IPO 
MktimingD = 
0 otherwise, i.e. “bear” market  
The conjecture about earnings management we examine is whether the pre-IPO discretionary accruals are 
systematically related to future stock price performance. We consider the predictability of pre-IPO 
accruals for post-IPO stock price performance in section. For our test, we divide IPO firms into four quartiles 
according to their pre-IPO discretionary accruals and compare the five year market adjusted returns for the IPOs 
in different quartiles. Quartile 1 represents the smallest discretionary accruals, and it is referred to as 
conservative quartile. Quartile 4, represents the largest discretionary accruals, and referred to as the aggressive 
                                                          
4
 The underlying assumption here as well as in LRR(1994) is that market condition and investors’ overoptimisim are highly 
positively correlated, making this a joint test of the timing ability and the validity of the proxy. 
5
 LRR (1994) and Logrhran and Ritter (1993) provide timing proposition based on inference about issuers forecasting ability 
made from observations’ that the number of IPOs is negatively related to long-run performance  and positively related to 
market peaks. 
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quartile. We also analyze differences in post-IPO stock returns between two portfolios of IPO firms classified by 
the median size of pre-IPO discretionary accruals. Table 4 presents the cut-offs, means and standard deviation 
for discretionary accruals for four quartiles in panel A . In panel B two median portfolios are formed on the basis 
of the cross-sectional variation in pre-IPO accruals (DAC). There is a substantial variation in the earnings 
management measures between the aggressive and conservative quartile. Mean discretionary pre-IPO accrual is -
10% of total assets in the conservative quartile (Q1), and 15% in the aggressive quartile (Q4). 
Table 4. Quartile and Median Cut-offs of Pre-IPO Accruals 
Panel B : Pre-IPO unexpected accruals quartiles cut-offs 
  DAC set  Mean Std.Dev No 
Quartile 1 (Q1) less than -0.0215 -0.10 0.07 12 
Quartile 2 (Q2) -0.0215 to 0.0391 -0.001 0.02 12 
Quartile 3 (Q3) 0.0391  to .0979 0.06 0.02 11 
Quartile 4 (Q4) Greater than 0.0979 0.15 0.07 12 
Panel B : Pre-IPO unexpected accruals median cut-offs 
Below Median Less than 0.0391 -0.04 0.06 24 
Above Median Greater than .0391 0.13 0.07 23 
This table presents cut-offs and mean/standard deviations of the four quartile portfolios in panel A, and 
two median portfolios in panel B, both formed by sorting on pre-IPO discretionary accruals(DAC1). Pre-IPO 
discretionary accruals (DAC1) are discretionary accruals in the fiscal of IPO. Quartile 1 is the most conservative 
portfolio with the lowest discretionary accruals, where as quartile 4 is the most aggressive portfolio with the 
highest discretionary accruals. 
3. Predicting Post-IPO Stock Returns with Market conditions and Pre-IPO accruals  
3.1 Effects of Market Conditions on Long-Run Performance 
In this sub-section, we examine the relation between our measures of relative bullishness of the market and the 
subsequent long-run performance. For this test, firms are categorized in two groups according to pre-IPO market 
conditions (MktimingD). In table 5, the wealth relatives for the IPOs coming in both bullish and bearish market 
are well below one (1.00). This indicates that both types of market condition issues underperformed, on average, 
the market benchmark.  
Table 5. Long-Run Performance Conditional on Market Conditions at the Time of Floatation 
Market Condition at the 
Time of Floatation 
No. of 
IPOs 
Average 3-year buy-and-hold 
returns 
Average 5-year buy-and-hold 
returns 
 
 
 
IPOs Market Wealth Relatives IPOs Market 
Wealth 
Relatives 
% %  % %  
Bear Market 41 -11.43 21.96 0.73 -5.18 59.88 0.59 
Bull Market 58 8.57 39.08 0.78 30.03 68.71 0.77 
All Firms 99 0.29 31.99 0.76 -3.15 45.74 0.66 
IPO firms in our sample are categorized according to market conditions at the time of floatation. An IPO is 
defined to have occurred in a relatively bull market period if the market index on the offering day is greater than 
the past-quarter( 66 days trading day) average of the market index preceding the offering day ( i.e.MIoff 
>MIavg66). Otherwise, the issue is defined to have been priced in a relatively bear market. The five-year buy-and-
hold return for firms going public is calculated excluding the initial return. Wealth relatives are calculated as 
[(1/ (1 )) /1/ (1 ))]mTN R N Rpi+ +∑ ∑ , where Rpi  is the holding period return from the 15th day closing 
price until the earlier of the delisting date or the five year anniversary of the IPO. mTR is the holding period 
return on the market over the same holding period, and the summation are over the N observations in each 
calendar year. Return is truncated on April, 2011. 
Figure 1 plots the average cumulative abnormal return time series performance of bullish-and bearish 
market issues. The figure also shows that both bullish- and bearish market issues significantly underperform the 
market benchmark by a cumulative -40.63% and -46.67% respectively in five years after going public. To asses 
the statistical significance, we compute a mean and standard deviation6 across the time-series realization of each 
market condition issues. The monthly mean (standard deviation) returns on the bullish-market issues and bearish 
market issues are -0.775 (3.01) and the bearish market issues are -1.11 (3.95) respectively. The t-statistics against 
the null hypothesis that multi year excess return are zero are -1.97 and -2.16 allowing us to infer that both market 
condition issues experienced significantly negative post-IPO performance.  As can be seen from the Table that 
the bearish market issues performed more poorly than those issued during bullish market. This suggests that 
underperformance is more prevalent among firms that went public under relatively bearish market condition. 
                                                          
6
 While computing standard deviation, first-order auto covariance of monthly return series is also accounted for. 
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This appears to be inconsistent with firms’ timing ability which claims that IPOs perform worse if issued in a 
buoyant market. Thus it can be concluded that Bangladeshi IPOs do not behave in the same manner as the 
premise of the timing ability proposition would have us believe. However, parametric means of difference ‘t-
test’ test fail to reject to the null hypothesis that the difference in the performance of bullish- and bearish –market 
issues is zero. The fact that we find no difference in the post-issue performance between bullish-and bearish 
market issues casts doubt on the timing ability of Bangladeshi IPO firms 
 
Figure1. Time-series graph of market adjusted Average Cumulative Abnormal return classified by Market 
Conditions at the time of Floatation. An IPO is defined to have occurred in a relatively bull market period if the 
market index on the offering day is greater than the past-quarter( 66 days trading day) average of the market 
index preceding the offering day ( i.e.MIoff >MIavg66). Otherwise, the issue is defined to have been priced in a 
relatively bear market. Returns are adjusted using the market benchmark. 
 
3.2 Post-IPO Returns by Pre-IPO Accruals Quartiles and Median Category 
The key issue we investigate is whether the pre-IPO discretionary accruals explain the observed post-IPO 
abnormal return performance. In this sub-section, we examine the conjecture that issuers often report unusually 
high earning by adopting discretionary accounting accruals adjustments that raise reported earnings relative to 
actual earning. As information about the firm is revealed over time by the media and analysts’ report and the 
subsequent financial reports, investors may realize that earnings are not maintaining the momentum, and 
investors thus may loose their overoptimisim. So other thing being equal the greater the earning management at 
the time of offering, the larger the ultimate price correction. 
For our tests, IPO firms are classified into four quartiles according to their pre-IPO accruals (DAC) 
and post-IPO stock price performance for the IPOs in the different quartiles are compared and analyzed. In panel 
A of Table 1.6 we report five year and three year buy-and hold return and wealth relatives for the portfolios of 
pre-IPO accrual quartiles. The wealth relatives of four quartiles show that all the quartiles are showing clear-cut 
underperformance. In addition to the quartile classification, we report post-IPO return performance of two 
portfolios in panel B of Table 6,where the cut-offs for these categories is the sample median value of pre-IPO 
accruals. The result indicates that in the long-run above median portfolio (more aggressive portfolio) performed 
better than below median portfolio (less aggressive portfolio). 
Table 6. Long-Run Performance Categorized by Pre-IPO Accruals (DAC) 
Pre-IPO 
Accruals(DAC) 
No. of 
IPOs 
Average 3-year Buy-and-hold return Average 5-year Buy-and hold 
return 
IPOs Market Wealth Relative IPOs Market 
Wealth 
Relative 
Panel A: Quartile Cut-offs       
Quartile 1 (Q1) 12 -11.19 7.82 0.82 -38.13 31.91 0.47 
Quartile 2 (Q2) 12 -40.15 0.66 0.59 -46.45 13.28 0.47 
Quartile 3 (Q3) 11 -44.25 -26.72 0.76 -63.89 -9.16 0.40 
Quartile 4 (Q4) 12 -36.34 -5.16 0.67 -44.81 -6.32 0.59 
Panel B: Median Cut-offs       
Below Median 24 -25.67 4.24 0.71 -42.29 22.59 0.47 
Above Median 23 -36.89 -15.47 0.75 -53.94 -7.67 0.50 
Time series graph of market adjusted average cumulative abnormal returns 
classified by market conditions at the time of floataion
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Unexpected accounting accruals (DAC) are discretionary accruals in the fiscal year. IPO firms are classified into 
four quartiles (1 being conservative, 4 being aggressive managers ) in panel A, and into two portfolios in panel B 
where the cut-off for these two categories is the sample median value of pre-IPO accruals. The five-year buy-
and-hold return for firms going public is calculated excluding the initial return. Wealth relatives are calculated as 
[(1/ (1 )) /1/ (1 ))]mTN R N Rpi+ +∑ ∑ , where Rpi  is the holding period return from the 15th day closing 
price until the earlier of the delisting date or the five year anniversary of the IPO. mTR is the holding period 
return on the market over the same holding period, and the summation are over the N observations in each 
calendar year. Return is truncated on April, 2011. 
Figure 2 presents a simple time-series graph of the average cumulative time-series performance of four 
portfolios, classified by the pre-IPO accrual (DAC) quartiles. Cumulative returns for the quartiles portfolios are 
computed as follows: we first cumulate the monthly abnormal market adjusted returns of individual stocks by 
compounding over time, and then take the cross-sectional average in the quartile to obtain the time-series 
portfolio returns. 
 
 
Figure 2: Time-series Graph of market Adjusted Average Cumulative Abnormal return classified by Pre-IPO 
accruals (DAC) quartiles. Unexpected accounting is discretionary accruals in the fiscal year. IPO firms are 
classified into four quartiles (1 being conservative, 4 being aggressive managers), and cumulative abnormal 
returns are plotted for each quartile over the 60 month following the IPO. Returns are adjusted using the market 
benchmark return. 
The figure shows that using the market adjusted return, firms with lowest pre-IPO accruals (the conservative 
quartile portfolio) underperformed by a cumulative of -43.54% in the five years after going public. Whereas 
firms with highest pre-IPO accruals (the aggressive quartile portfolio) underperformed by a cumulative -67.79%. 
We compute the mean and standard deviation of across the time series realization of each quartile portfolio. The 
monthly mean (standard deviation) return on the four quartile portfolios are -1.02(6.73), -1.02(4.12), -2.43(8.45) 
and -1.57(4.49).Thus, the t-statistics against the null hypothesis that the multi –year excess returns are zero -1.16, 
-1.91, -2.21 and -2.68. This indicates that the conservative quartile portfolio managers experienced insignificant 
negative post-IPO return, whereas the second quartile portfolio managers experience marginally significant 
negative return and the rest quartiles (relatively more aggressive portfolios) experienced significantly negative 
post-IPO performance. It implies that when managers manage pre-IPO accruals more aggressively, those firms 
are more likely to underperform in future.   
Time-Series Graph of Market Adjusted Average Cumulative Abnormal returns Classified 
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Figure 3: Time-Series Graph of Market-Adjusted Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
classified by Pre-IPO Accruals (DAC) Median. Unexpected accounting accruals (DAC) are discretionary 
accruals in the fiscal year. IPO firms are classified into two portfolios, where the cut-off for the two portfolios is 
the sample value of median pre-IPO accruals, and cumulative abnormal returns are plotted for each portfolio 
over the first 60 months following the IPO. Returns are adjusted using the market benchmark return. 
In figure 3, we also report a plot of the average cumulative time-series performance of the portfolios of below-
and-above-median pre-accruals. The monthly mean (standard deviation) on the time series realization of below-
and-above median accrual portfolio are -0.949 (6.18) and -2.17 (3.50). The t-statistics against the null hypothesis 
that multi year excess returns are zero are -1.18 and -4.76; suggesting that only more aggressive above median 
accrual portfolios experienced significantly negative post-IPO returns.  
As can be also seen, the portfolio of above median pre-IPO accruals, relatively more aggressive portfolio, 
significantly underperformed more than the portfolio of below median pre-IPO accruals, relatively less 
aggressive portfolios.7 Thus it appears that the overall poor post-IPO performance can, at least partially, be 
explained by the unusually pre-IPO earnings management by IPO firms. 
Table 7. Average Cumulative Return by pre-IPO Accruals (DAC) 
Post IPO Month Market Adjusted Return Below M Above M Q1 Q4 
10 5.20 -5.70 22.39 3.87 
20 10.17 -29.41 10.37 -24.11 
30 -13.25 -44.74 7.35 -35.40 
40 -44.13 -54.17 -42.41 -54.05 
50 -44.90 -59.91 -43.92 -58.50 
60 -55.71 -73.02 -55.68 -67.64 
This table documents cumulative return by two extreme pre-IPO accrual quartile portfolios and median 
accrual portfolios over the first 60 months of seasoning after going public.Q1 refers to the conservative pre-IPO 
discretionary accrual quartile and Q4 refers to the aggressive pre-IPO discretionary accrual quartile. While below 
M and above M refer to the below median and above median pre-IPO discretionary accruals respectively. The 
CAR series is one for return adjusted by the benchmark of the portfolio of the firms. Returns are compounded 
and cumulated event-monthly, and the 15th day (equilibrium) return is excluded.  
Table 7 reports the cumulative performance of two extreme quartile portfolio and median portfolio by pre-IPO 
discretionary accruals (DAC), analogous to figure 1.2 and figure 1.3. 
The table shows that the returns differential between the conservative pre-IPO accrual quartile 1 (low accruals) 
portfolio and the aggressive pre-IPO quartile 4 (high quartile) portfolio is 11.96% in the sixty month period. 
3.3 Regression of Post-IPO Returns on Accruals and Market Conditions  
Table 8 presents the results from OLS regression of post-IPO stock price performance on pre-IPO accruals and 
market conditions. The dependent variable is post-IPO abnormal stock return measured, using the market 
benchmark, from the 15th trading day closing price to the earlier of five year anniversary or its delisting date. We 
investigate whether pre-IPO discretionary accruals (D_accruals), Unmanaged accruals (UMA), short-run 
Underpricing (UP), market conditions(MkttimingD), sales growth(Sales_g) are systematically related to the 
long-run performance of IPOs. The results are reported in Table 8 of column (i).All the negative coefficients of 
the variables except sales growth indicates that all these variables negatively affect long-run performance of the 
                                                          
7
 Parametric means of difference “t-test” show that the difference in the aftermarket performance of these two portfolios is 
significant from zero at 5% level. 
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IPOs. 
Table 8. Regression result on Post-IPO Return on Accruals and Market Condition 
Independent Variable Market Adjusted Return 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Intercepts- 
(t-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-t/) 
(P/ Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-P/) 
-36.41 
(-2.86/-2.83) 
(0.003/0.003) 
-59.59 
(-2.33//-1.30) 
(.013/.000) 
-26.69 
(-0.53/-0.81) 
(0.30/0.212) 
-19.91 
(-0.38/-0.60) 
(.351/.276) 
D_accruals 
(t-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-/) 
(P-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-P/) 
-129.95 
(-1.41*/-1.07) 
(0.083/0.147) 
-153.49 
(-1.55**/-1.30*) 
(.065/0.100) 
-153.75 
(-1.56**/-1.28*) 
(-.064/.104) 
-151.95 
(-1.53**/-1.28*) 
(0.067/0.105) 
UMA 
(t-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-t) 
(P-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-/P) 
-85.55 
(-.092/-.076) 
(0.181/0.23) 
-189.81 
(-1.76**/-1.52**) 
(0.044/.069) 
-164.49 
(-1.51**/-1.37*) 
(.069/.091) 
-172.39 
(-1.57**/-1.37*) 
(.063/.089) 
UP 
(t-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-t/) 
(P-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-/P) 
-.019 
(-0.51/-0.92) 
(0.306/0.183) 
-.029 
((-.063/-0.94) 
(.265/.177) 
----- 
----- 
----- 
-.036 
(-0.77/-1.08) 
(.223/.143) 
MkttimingD- 
(t-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-t/) 
(P-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-/P) 
-3.106 
(-0.17/-0.16) 
(0.43/0.44) 
-8.99 
(-0.45/-0.44) 
(0.33/.033) 
-15.209 
(-0.75/-0.86) 
(0.228/.198) 
-12.56 
(-0.61/-0.65) 
(0.273/0.261) 
Sales_g 
(t-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-t/) 
(P-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-/P) 
5.57 
(1.48**/3.20***) 
(0.074/0.001) 
6.42 
(1.52**/2.85***) 
(0.069/0.003) 
6.74 
(1.61**/3.18***) 
(0.059/.001) 
6.33 
(1.49**/2.97***) 
(0.073/.002) 
Industries Dummies 
 
Ln offsize 
(t-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-t/) 
(P-/Heteroskedasticity 
corrected-P) 
-- 
-- 
 
Full set not 
reported 
 
Full set not 
reported 
 
Full set not 
reported 
-9.238 
(-0.88/-1.19) 
(0.192/0.121) 
R2 
Adj. R2 
F-statistics 
N 
-0.119 
 0.0120 
0.369 
47 
0.2426 
-0.0247 
0.549 
47 
0.2600 
-0.0315 
0.569 
47 
0.2600 
-0.0315 
0.569 
47 
Note :  ****, ** and * indicates significance at 1%, 5%  and 10% level respectively. 
The dependent variable is the five year post-IPO abnormal returns computed using the 15th day aftermarket 
trading day closing price as purchase price. Monthly returns for each IPO firms are adjusted by subtracting the 
market benchmark, and then compounded and cumulated for five years. The independent variables are pre-IPO 
discretionary accruals, unmanaged accruals, short-run underpricing, and market timing dummy. To adjust for 
some cross-sectional contemporaneous correlation between securities cumulative return , we include but do not 
report a complete set of industry dummy  and log of offer size. 
 
4. The findings of the cross sectional regression of accruals and Market Conditions on Long-run 
performance 
D_accruals: Discretionary accruals (D_accruals) are the proxy for earning management. Higher the earning 
management by the managers, higher is the long-run underperfromance.The coefficient estimate is negative in 
all the models of the regression and significant. So discretionary accruals as a proxy of earning management is 
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significantly affecting long-run performance of IPOs. 
UMA : UMA is the proxy for unmanaged accruals. Given the business conditions typically faced by the firm in 
the industry, some accrual adjustments are appropriate and necessary, and so are expected by investors. 
Nondiscretionary accruals or unmanaged accruals are the asset-scaled proxies for unmanipulated accruals 
dictated by business conditions. So it is expected that unmanaged accruals should have negative relationship. 
The coefficient estimate is negative in all the models of the regression and significant in model (ii),(iii) and 
(iv).So it can be inferred that higher the unmanaged accruals higher is the long-run underperformance. 
UP: UP is the acronym for short-run underpricing.The coefficient estimate is negative in all three models but not 
significant. The insignificant coefficient implies that there exists no relationship between underpricing and long-
run underperformance. This infers that - the two anomalies i.e. underpricing and long-run underperformance do 
co exists. 
MkttimingD: MkttimingD is the proxy for market condition. The negative coefficient of MkttimingD implies 
that in the long-run, there is a weak tendency among bullish market issues performing poorly compared to 
bearish market issues. It should be noted that however the coefficient is not significant. 
Sales_g: The sales growth (Sales_g) coefficient is significantly positive in all the regression model. It implies 
that sales growth has strong positive impact on long-run underpricing. Higher the sales growth higher would be 
the stock returns in the long-run. 
In model (ii), (iii) and (iv) we do not report, but include a set of control variable to demonstrate that 
discretionary accruals, unmanaged accruals, market condition and sales growth effect is unique and novel. As in 
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter(1995) , that there is a variation in the post-IPO performance across 
industries. Consequently we include a complete set of industry dummies. In model (iii), the underpricing (UP) 
dummy variable is dropped considering the notion that its effect would probably be captured by the introduction 
of industry dummies. Furthermore log of offersize variable is added for controlling firm characteristics in our 
regression in model (iv).We report only the coefficient estimate and statistics associated with pre-IPO 
discretionary accruals, unmanaged accruals, underpricing, market timing dummy and sales growth, log of 
offersize variable in Table 8. 
Our regression result indicates that discretionary accruals, unmanaged accruals and sales growth are 
statistically significant. This implies that firms that aggressively managed pre-IPO accruals aggressively in 
boosting pre-IPO earnings, performed significantly worse in the aftermarket. The strong significant positive sales 
growth coefficient implies that higher the sales growth superior would be the performance of that firm in the 
long-run. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the firms’ timing ability proposition that has been offered as one of the 
explanations for long-run underperformance of IPOs. We find that bearish market issues performed poorly than 
those issued in a relative bullish market. It suggests that underperformance is more prevalent among firms that 
went public under relatively bearish market conditions. This phenomena is not consistent with the firms’ timing 
ability proposition put forward by Ritter (1991) and Lougran,Ritter and Rydqvist(1994). 
However, the fact that we find no significant difference in the post-issue performance of IPOs issued 
either in a buoyant market or in a sluggish market. It sheds some doubt on the ability of the Bangladeshi IPO 
firms to time their offerings in order to take advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’. 
This paper has also examined whether pre-IPO earning management, measured by discretionary 
accruals, can explain the long-run post-issue return underperformance of IPOs. In previous study conducted by 
(Imam & Jaber,2010) found that entrepreneurs of IPOs coming to the market during 1991-2000, behaved 
myopically in boosting earnings in the year prior to going public. But their objective of the study was to test the 
value relevance hypothesis in IPOs which states that “Pre-IPO earnings management by issuers is positively 
related to firm’s initial value.” But in this study we have aimed at testing whether there exists any relation 
between subsequent firms underperformance and earnings management (the long-run market performance of 
initial public offering firms) which is termed as disappointment hypothesis. In other words, when earning of 
IPOs have been declined gradually because of adjustment of pre-IPO accruals over the five years periods, 
investors are disappointed with earning performance of IPOs in the long-run. Hence downward price correction 
is taking place reflecting the poor long-run performance of IPOs, which is termed as disappointment hypothesis.  
We find that in the long run, IPOs performed poorly when managers aggressively manage pre-IPO 
discretionary accruals of these firms to report high pre-IPO earnings than when they manage pre-IPO 
discretionary accruals conservatively. Using the market adjusted return, the most conservative quartile firms 
(firms with lowest pre-IPO accruals) earned a five-year return of -55.68% though statically insignificant. In 
contrast, the most aggressive quartile firms (firms with the highest pre-IPO accruals) earned a five-year 
significant cumulative abnormal return of -67.64%. Notably, we find that pre-IPO discretionary accruals are 
good predictors of the post-IPO return performance of Bangladeshi IPOs. 
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Our evidence suggests that investors failed to properly adjust for pre-IPO discretionary accruals 
component of earnings and hence their valuations appear related to pre-IPO earnings performance that they 
naively extrapolated to the future. Under this interpretation, the failure to adjust properly for pre-IPO accrual 
component of earnings led investors to have high initial expectations of firms’ future earning growth, and 
subsequent revelation about the actual accruals caused a downward correction in stock price. 
There is a common view about earnings management and stock issues. The view holds that some firms 
opportunistically manipulate earnings upward before stock issues. According to this opportunism hypothesis, 
investors are deceived and led to form overly optimistic expectations regarding future, post-issue earnings. Thus, 
offering firms would be able to obtain a higher price than they otherwise would for their stock issue, but 
subsequent earnings would tend to be quite unsatisfactory. This view emphasizes the incentives that 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and managers have to maximize issue proceeds, given the number of shares 
offered. Ritter (1991) provided empirical evidence that IPO firms' stock returns are significantly less than those 
of a matched sample of non-IPO firms over the three-year period after offering. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that entrepreneurs mislead investors by earnings management. Jain and Kini (1994) and Imam and 
Amin (2010) examined accounting measures of operating performance of IPO firms in US and Bangladesh 
respectively. They found that firms exhibit a decline in operating performance after their IPOs. They suggested 
that potential investors may initially have high expectations of future earnings growth that are not subsequently 
fulfilled. 
All the empirical evidence produced elsewhere, including our findings, that earning management prior 
to IPO tends to mislead investors to extrapolate pre-IPO earnings into the future, suggest that the relationship 
between abnormal accruals and post-offer stock returns appears to be part of a more general empirical regularity.  
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Appendix 1 
Empirical Model to Test the Earnings Management Detection Hypothesis 
Researchers have investigated two venues of earnings management: (i) the choice of accounting methods, and 
(ii) the management of accruals. 
This paper focuses in management of accruals approach because accruals reflect not only the choice of 
accounting methods but also the effect of recognition and timing of revenues and expenses, asset write-downs 
and changes in accounting estimates. In this study total accruals are analyzed separating into two parts – 
discretionary (managed) accruals and non-discretionary (unmanaged) accruals. 
Jones (1991) suggested cross-industry approach as well as time series approach to decompose accruals into 
normal (unmanaged) and abnormal (managed) components. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) used both Jones’ time 
series model and a modified cross-industry model in their investigation of earnings management near to debt 
covenant violations. They reported that the magnitudes of the coefficients from the cross-sectional models were 
quite similar to those obtained from the time-series models, and that their conclusions were the same under either 
estimation method. 
Accruals depend upon the economic conditions faced by firms (Kaplan, 1985). The cross-industry models 
control for economic factors that influence accruals using the same independent variables as Jones' time-series 
model. For each relevant industry, accruals are regressed on the control variables taking data from one year prior 
to the IPO. This regression model provides the benchmarks for the unmanaged or normal accruals. These 
benchmark coefficients along with the data of the IPO firm give us the unmanaged accruals of the IPO firm. We 
then get the managed accrual by subtracting unmanaged accruals from total accruals. The standardized 
cross-sectional model that was used by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) is as follows: 
TACiy/TAiy-l = aoj [1/TAiy-l] + a1j [∆REViy/TAiy-1] + a2j [PPEiy/TAiy-l] + eiy       [1] 
   Where, 
TACiy=Total accruals (net income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations) in the year ‘y’ 
for the ‘i-th’ firm in the industry group matched with offering firm ‘j’. 
TAiy-l =Total assets prior to the year ‘y’ for the ‘i-th’ firm in the industry group matched with offering firm ‘j’. 
∆REViy=Change in revenues in the year ‘y’ for the ‘i-th’ firm in the industry group matched with offering firm 
‘j’. 
PPEiy=Gross property, plant and equipment in the year ‘y’ for the ‘i-th’ firm in the industry group matched with 
offering firm ‘j’. 
eiy=Regression disturbances, assumed cross-sectional uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero. 
We get the values of the coefficients from regression of the model. Then putting the data of the IPO firms with 
these coefficients’ values and subtracting from total accruals we get the managed portion of accruals as a fraction 
of total assets. The following model is called by DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2000) as the ‘Forecast Error 
Model’. 
TAEMjy = [TACjy/TAjy-1] - aoj [1/TAjy-l] – a1j [(∆REVjy - ∆RECjy)/TAjy-1] - a2j [PPEjy/TAjy-1]   [2] 
Where, 
TAEMjy=Managed component of total accruals. 
∆RECjy=Changes in accounts receivable. 
The term ∆RECjy is subtracted from the change in revenues because offering firm may inflate sales through easy 
credit policies. 
Dechow (1994) showed that accruals are negatively associated with contemporaneous components of cash flow 
from operation. Her results suggested that cash flows are useful in determining expected accruals and she 
concluded that future research should consider inclusion of cash flows in models identifying them. Therefore, if 
we include operating cash flow from operation among the variables in ‘Forecast Error Model’ we get the ‘Cash 
Flow Model’ to estimate managed accruals. 
TACiy/TAiy-l = aoj [1/TAiy-l] + a1j [∆REViy/TAiy-1] + a2j [PPEiy/TAiy-l] + a3j [∆CFOiy/TAiy-l] + eiy     [3] 
Where, 
∆CFOiy=Changes in cash flow from operation. 
 
Appendix 2: 
To evaluate the long-run performance of IPOs, two measures were employed: 1) the average cumulative 
abnormal return metric (CARs,T) with implicit reweighting event “portfolio” every month, and (2) average buy-
and-hold return in excess of the benchmark buy-and-hold returns. 
A traditional event study performance analysis was conducted over the post IPO (also referred to as the 
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seasoning) period. The raw returns are adjusted for general movements using a standard “market” adjustment 
which reflects conservatively the assumedly high risk of IPO shares; 
it it mtar r r= −
 
where itar is the abnormal return for stock i in month t , itr is the raw return on stock i in the month t, and mtr is 
the corresponding return on the market index during the same time period. This approach of market adjusted 
return is equivalent to using standard version of the Capital Asset pricing Model (CAPM), with beta assumed to 
be unity, as the return generating model. The DSE all share price index was used as market benchmark. 
Each issuing firm was followed from the first day of trading until the earliest of its delisting date or the end of 60 
post-IPO seasoning month, or April 2011(last month of data collection). The monthly return series are adjusted 
for capital changes8. The return during the first month of seasoning is the return measured from the equilibrium 
trading day to the last trading calendar day of the first trading month less the equivalent market index return. 
Hence the time interval of the first month market adjusted return varies from 1 to 30 calendar days. The average 
abnormal return for month t following the IPO is: 
1
1 t
t
n
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∑
  
where tn  is the number of issues present in the cross section in post–IPO month t. The average cumulative 
abnormal return metric [Dimson and Marsh (1986)] from the month s to month T is the cross-sectional average 
of the individual cumulative compounded abnormal return9 . 
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The use of ,s TCAR  implicitly reweight our event “portfolio” every month.10Since such a portfolio strategy is 
difficult to implement, we also analyze buy–and-hold returns alternatively. The buy-and- hold return for firm i   
is defined as: 
  
( )min( , )
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where ( )min ,T delist is the earlier of its delisting date or the end of the five year window. For firms that went 
public near the end of our sample period, the delisting date is no later than April, 2011, since the return interval 
is truncated on this date.  
Following Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), we also compute wealth relative as a performance 
measure, which can be defined as: 
1 averge 5-year buy- and-hold return of IPO
   1 averge 5-year buy-and-hold return of market
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A wealth relative (WR) of greater than one (WR>1) indicates that IPOs are outperforming the market 
benchmark, while a wealth relative of less than one (WR<1) indicates IPO underperformance. 
  
                                                          
8
 All price series were adjusted for dividends, splits, right offering and other capital changes. 
9
 Alternatively, the Cumulative Abnormal Return can be cumulated by summing up over time the ARt. But this is bias 
because it does not compound the ARt. and monthly cumulate the estimation errors in single period return, as pointed out by 
Conrad and Kaul(1993). 
10
 This reweighting implies reducing the holding of stock which have apparently appreciated and increasing the holding in 
stock which have apparently depreciated and hence it does not realistically represent a typical investor’s behavior. 
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